This paper is concerned with secret-key agreement by public discussion. Assume that two parties Alice and Bob and an adversary Eve have access to independent realizations of random variables X, Y , and Z, respectively, with joint distribution P XY Z . The secret key rate S(X; Y jjZ) has been de ned as the maximal rate at which Alice and Bob can generate a secret key by communication over an insecure, but authenticated channel such that Eve's information about this key is arbitrarily small. We de ne a new conditional mutual information measure, the intrinsic conditional mutual information between X and Y when given Z, denoted by I(X; Y # Z), which is an upper bound on S(X; Y jjZ). The special scenarios are analyzed where X, Y , and Z are generated by sending a binary random variable R, for example a signal broadcast by a satellite, over independent channels, or two scenarios in which Z is generated by sending X and Y over erasure channels. In the rst two scenarios it can be shown that the secret key rate is strictly positive if and only if I(X; Y #Z) is strictly positive. For the third scenario a new protocol is presented which allows secret-key agreement even when all the previously known protocols fail.
copy of the ciphertext C received by the legitimate receiver Bob, where C is obtained by Alice as a function of the plaintext message M and a secret key K shared by Alice and Bob. Shannon de ned a cipher system to be perfect if I(M; C) = 0; i.e., if the ciphertext gives no information about the plaintext or, equivalently, if M and C are statistically independent. When a perfect cipher is used to encipher a message M, an adversary can do no better than guess M without even looking at the ciphertext C. Shannon proved the pessimistic result that perfect secrecy can be achieved only when the secret key is at least as long as the plaintext message or, more precisely, when H(K) H(M):
For this reason, perfect secrecy is often believed to be impractical. In 13] this pessimism has been relativized by pointing out that Shannon's apparently innocent assumption that, except for the secret key, the opponent has access to precisely the same information as the legitimate receiver, is very restrictive and that indeed in many practical scenarios, especially if one considers the fact that every transmission of data is ultimately based on the transmission of an analog signal subject to noise, the adversary has some minimal uncertainty about the signal received by the legitimate receivers.
Wyner 19] and subsequently Csisz ar and K orner 6] considered a scenario in which the opponent Eve is assumed to receive messages transmitted by the sender Alice over a channel that is noisier than the legitimate receiver Bob's channel. The assumption that Eve's channel is worse than the main channel is unrealistic in general. It was shown in 13] that this assumption is not needed if Alice and Bob can also communicate over a completely insecure (but authenticated) public channel.
For the case where Alice, Bob, and Eve have access to repeated independent realizations of random variables X, Y , and Z, respectively, with joint distribution P XY Z , the rate at which Alice and Bob can generate a secret key by public discussion over an insecure channel is de ned in 11] (as a strengthened version of the de nition given in 13]) as follows. We assume in the following that the distribution P XY Z is publicly known.
De nition 1: The secret key rate of X and Y with respect to Z, denoted by S(X; Y jjZ), is the maximum rate at which Alice and Bob can agree on a secret key S in such a way that the amount of information that Eve obtains about S is arbitrarily small. In other words, it is the maximal R such that for every " > 0 and for all su ciently large N there exists a protocol, using public discussion over an insecure but authenticated channel, such that Alice and Bob, who receive X N = X 1 ; : : : ; X N ] and Y N = Y 1 ; : : : ; Y N ], respectively, compute the same key S with probability at least 1 ? ", satisfying I(S; V Z N ) " ; (1) 1 N H(S) R ? " ; (2) and 1 H(S) log jSj ? " : (3) Here, V denotes the collection of messages sent over the insecure channel by Alice and Bob, and Z N stands for Z 1 ; : : : ; Z N ].
Remark. Note that this de nition corresponds to the strong secret key rate as introduced in 11] . In contrast to all earlier de nitions of a rate made in the context of secret transmissions (e.g., of the secrecy capacity in Wyner's 19] and Csisz ar and K orner's 6] models), not only the rate at which Eve obtains information about the secret key, but the total amount of information she learns about this key, must be arbitrarily small. However, it will be shown in a nal version of 11] that the secret key rates with respect to the weaker and stronger de nitions are equal. Hence we can restrict ourselves to the stronger, more satisfactory de nition. Remark. The problem of secret-key agreement has also been studied for the case where the channel connecting Alice and Bob is not authentic, i.e., the adversary is also able to modify or insert messages. It has been shown in 10], 14] , 18] that secret-key agreement can even be possible in this case (if the distribution P XY Z satis es certain properties).
The following lower bound on S(X; Y jjZ) is proved in 11] (and rst in 13] for the weaker de nition), and follows from a result by Csisz ar and K orner 6]. Throughout the paper, all logarithms are to the base 2.
We give a brief outline of the rest of this paper. In Section 2 we de ne a new conditional information measure and show that this measure gives an improved upper bound on the secret key rate. In Section 3 we formulate some fundamental properties of the secret key rate. Sections 4 and 5 address the problem whether secret-key agreement is always possible when this new upper bound is strictly positive. We consider this for the cases where X, Y , and Z are generated by sending a binary random variable over independent channels (Scenario 1 in Section 4), and where Z is generated by sending X and Y over erasure channels (Scenarios 2 and 3 in Section 5). For Scenarios 1 and 2 it is shown that secret-key agreement is possible if the intrinsic conditional information is positive. For a generalized version of Scenario 2, in which Eve obtains both Alice's and Bob's information with a certain probability 1 ? , the new information measure is shown to be closely related to and to a new, natural quantity measuring the deviation of Alice's and Bob's information from statistically independent information. For Scenario 3 nally, we show that a new protocol is more powerful than the previously known protocols.
II. The Intrinsic Conditional Mutual Information

A. Motivation and De nition
The following upper bound on the secret key rate was proved in 13]:
S(X; Y jjZ) minfI(X; Y ); I(X; Y jZ)g : (4) Trying to reduce the quantity I(X; Y jZ) in this bound, the adversary Eve can send the random variable Z over a channel, characterized by P ZjZ , in order to generate the random variable Z. Obviously, S(X; Y jjZ) S(X; Y jjZ) I(X; Y jZ) (5) holds for every such Z. A similar bound also appeared in 1]. Inequality (5) motivates the following de nition of the intrinsic conditional mutual information between X and Y when given Z, which is the in mum of I(X; Y jZ), taken over all discrete random variables Z that can be obtained by sending Z over a channel, characterized by P ZjZ .
De nition 2: For a distribution P XY Z , the intrinsic conditional mutual information be- Intuitively, giving the side information Z \destroys" all the information between X and Y , but generates new conditional mutual information (that cannot be used to generate a secret key). In contrast to I(X; Y jZ), the intrinsic information I(X; Y # Z) measures only the remaining conditional mutual information between X and Y (possibly reduced by giving Z), but not the additional information between X and Y brought in by Z.
B. A Graphical Representation
Let X and Y be random variables. Then the quantities H(XY ), H(X), H(Y ), H(XjY ), H(Y jX), and I(X; Y ) can be graphically represented (see Figure 1) . Note that the union of all inner regions corresponds to H(XY ). We are now interested in a representation of I(X; Y # Z). When given arbitrary X, Y , and Z (i.e., even when R(X; Y ; Z) < 0), we consider all the random variables Z that can be generated by sending Z over a channel P ZjZ An even stronger conjecture would be that S(X; Y jjZ) = I(X; Y # Z) holds for every distribution P XY Z . In the following sections we prove the validity of Conjecture 1 for several special scenarios. It is a fundamental open problem to prove or disprove the conjecture for the general case. As a preparation for the analysis in the following sections we prove some important and basic properties of the secret key rate. The three lemmas below are very intuitive and follow quite directly from the de nition of the secret key rate. Lemma 3 states that Alice and Bob cannot increase the secret key rate by ignoring certain realizations of the random variables X and Y . We say that Alice and Bob obtain new random variables by restriction of the ranges if they discard realizations that do not lie in certain subsetsX andŶ of X and Y. Lemma 
In other words, the secret key rate cannot be increased by restricting the ranges of X and Y .
Proof: The secret key rate S(X; Y jjZ) is the maximum key-generation rate, taken over all possible protocols between Alice and Bob. One possible strategy is to restrict the ranges of their random variables. With probability P( ), they both receive random variablesX andŶ , respectively, and inequality (7) follows. Proof: Obviously, only condition (1) in the de nition of the secret key rate is a ected.
Because I(S; V Z; U] N ) " implies I(S; V Z N ) ", the lemma follows.
Theorem 6 is an immediate consequence of the three Lemmas 3, 4, and 5.
De nition 3: We say that X and Y are generated from X and Y with positive probability if one can obtain from X and Y random variablesX andŶ by restriction of the ranges (see above), and the random variables X and Y by sendingX andŶ over two channels, speci ed by P XjX and P Y jŶ .
Theorem 6: Let X, Y , Z, and U be arbitrary random variables, and let X and Y be generated from X and Y with positive probability. Then S(X; Y jj Z; U]) > 0 implies S(X; Y jjZ) > 0.
IV. Noisy Versions of a Binary Signal
The rst special scenario, which we analyze completely in this section, is de ned as follows. Scenario 1. Let R be an arbitrary binary random variable, and let X, Y , and Z be arbitrary discrete random variables, generated by sending R over independent channels C A , C B , and C E , i.e., P XY ZjR = P XjR P Y jR P ZjR : (8) In other words, X, Y , and Z are statistically independent when given R. is a di erent but equivalent characterization of Scenario 1. There exist 0 1 and probability distributions P (1) X , P (2) X , P (1) Y , P (2) Y , P (1) Z , and P (2) Z such that
i.e., P XY Z is a weighted sum of two di erent distributions over the set X Y Z that both correspond to independent random variables with ranges X, Y, and Z. The results of this section hold for all distributions with this property.
The main result of this section is the following theorem, which characterizes completely the cases for which S(X; Y jjZ) > 0 in Scenario 1, i.e., for which secret-key agreement is possible in principle, and which implies that Conjecture 1 is true in this case. Theorem 7: In Scenario 1, the following conditions are equivalent. The proof that (A) implies (B) is subdivided into several steps stated below as lemmas.
We begin with the special case where R is a symmetric binary random variable and all three channels are binary symmetric. This special result is not necessary for the proof of Theorem 7, but we show it in order to present the protocol and some estimates that will be useful later. In Appendix A we prove a result similar to Theorem 7 for continuous random variables X, Y , and Z generated from independent binary-input channels.
A. Binary Symmetric Channels
Let us rst consider the following special case of Scenario 1. Let P R (0) = P R (1) = 1=2 and consider three binary symmetric channels C A , C B , and C E with bit error probabilities ; , and ", respectively, i.e., we have P XjR (0; 0) = 1 ? ; P Y jR (0; 0) = 1 ? ; and P ZjR (0; 0) = 1 ? " ; where 0 < 1=2, 0 < 1=2, and 0 < " 1=2. We can assume here that = , i.e., that Alice's and Bob's channels are identical. If for example < , Alice can cascade her channel with another binary symmetric channel with error probability ( ? )=(1 ?2 ) to obtain error probability . (In this particular case of binary symmetric channels it is not even necessary to assume = . The statement of Lemma 8 also holds if 6 = when the party with the greater error probability is the sender and the other party is the receiver in Protocol A described below.) Scenario 1. It is obvious that Eve's optimal strategy for guessing C is to compute the block (C X 1 ) Z 1 ; : : : ; (C X N ) Z N ] and guess C as 0 if at least half of the bits in this block are 0, and as 1 otherwise. Note that although it is not the adversary's ultimate goal to guess the bits C sent by Alice, Lemma 10 below leads, from Eve's error probability when guessing these bits, to a lower bound on the secret key rate.
Protocol A is computationally e cient, but it is not e cient in terms of the size of the generated secret key. There exist variants of the protocol, using parity checks instead of repeat codes, that are much more e cient in terms of the achievable key generation rate 12].
We show rst that for all possible choices of and ", in particular even if Eve's channel is superior to both Alice's and Bob's channel, Bob's error probability N about the bit sent by Alice decreases, for N ?! 1, asymptotically faster than Eve's error probability N when she uses the optimal strategy for guessing this bit. (Note that N is an average error probability, and that for a particular realization, Eve's error probability will typically be smaller or greater than N .)
Lemma 8 01 : (10) The last expression is half of the probability that Bob receives the correct codeword and that Eve receives the same number of 0's and 1's, given that Bob accepts. Note that (10) gives a lower bound on Eve's average error probability when guessing C for all possible strategies because in this symmetric case, Eve obtains no information about the bit C, and half of the guesses will be incorrect. From Lemma 9 we conclude that For " = 0 equality holds in (11), and for " > 0 the greater factor of the product under the square root is decreased by the same value by which the smaller factor is increased.
Hence the square root of this product is greater than ? 2 . (For " = 1=2 the factors are equal, and the left hand side of (11) is maximal, as expected.) Because (1 ? 2 + 2 2 ) N p a;N = (1 ? 2 + 2 2 ) N + (2 ? 2 2 ) N < 2 (1 ? 2 + 2 2 ) N ; (12) we conclude that N b N and N c N for su ciently large N, b = (2 ? 2 2 )=(1 ? 2 + 2 2 ), and c = 2 p 00 01 =(1 ? 2 + 2 2 ) ? (where can be made arbitrarily small for su ciently large N). From the above, we conclude that c > b for su ciently small .
The fact that Eve has a greater error probability than Bob when guessing C does not automatically imply that Eve has a greater uncertainty about this bit in terms of Shannon entropy, and hence that S(X; Y jjZ) > 0. The next lemma together with Lemma 8 nevertheless implies that the secret key rate is positive in Scenario 1.1.
Lemma 10: Let X, Y , and Z be arbitrary random variables, and let C be a bit, randomly chosen by Alice. Assume that for all N, Alice can generate a message M from X N (where X N = X 1 ; : : : ; X N ]) and C (and possibly some random bits) such that with some probability p a;N > 0, Bob (who knows M and Y N ) publicly accepts and can compute a bit where p E;ẑ is the probability of guessing C incorrectly with the optimal strategy given thatẐ =ẑ. Note that p E;ẑ 1=2, hence h(p E;ẑ ) p E;ẑ , for allẑ. Given that Bob publicly rejects, we have H(XjŶ ) = H(XjẐ) = H(XjU) = 0. From p a;N > 0 we conclude that I(X;Ŷ ) ? I(X;Ẑ) > 0.
B. General Binary-Input Channels and the Proof of Theorem 7
First we show that the above results hold even when Eve knows R precisely with a certain probability smaller than 1. This is the case if Z is generated from R by a binary erasure channel instead of a binary symmetric channel, i.e., if Z is either equal to a special erasure symbol , or else Z = R. Scenario 1.2. Let R, X, and Y be as in Scenario 1.1, but let Z be generated from R by a (possibly asymmetric) binary erasure channel (with erasure symbol ) C E , independent of the pair (C A ,C B ), and with transition probabilities P ZjR ( ; 0) = > 0, P ZjR (0; 0) = 1 ? , P ZjR ( ; 1) = 0 > 0, and P ZjR (1; 1) = 1 ? 0 . Proof: We show rst that we can assume without loss of generality that C E is symmetric. Let < 0 , and let an oracle be given that tells Eve the correct bit R with probability ( 0 ? )= 0 if R = 1 and Z = . According to Lemma 5, the additional information U provided by this oracle cannot increase the secret key rate. The random variable Z, together with the oracle, is equivalent to a random variable generated from R by a symmetric binary erasure channel with erasure probability , and which is independent of the pair (C A ,C B ). If = 1, the lemma is trivial. Let < 1, and let 0 < < minf ; 1 ? g. For su ciently large N, the probability that the number of bits (out of N bits) known to Eve is even and lies between (1 ? ? )N and (1 ? + )N is at least 1=3. We can assume without loss of generality that N and (1 ? ? )N are even integers. (Otherwise, can be chosen slightly smaller in order to ful ll this.) We give a lower bound on Eve's average error probability N about the bit sent by Alice, given that Bob accepts. As in the proof of Lemma 8 we obtain a lower bound on Eve's error probability N by taking a (small) part of all positive terms adding up to N (iii) There exist x; x 0 2 X such that P XjR (x; 0) > P XjR (x; 1) and P XjR (x 0 ; 0) < P XjR (x 0 ; 1) ; (14) there exist y; y 0 2 Y such that P Y jR (y; 0) > P Y jR (y; 1) and P Y jR (y 0 ; 0) < P Y jR (y 0 ; 1) ; (15) and there exists z 2 Z such that P Z (z) > 0 and 0 < P RjZ (0; z) < 1 :
(16) Proof: First we give an alternative characterization of the independence of the three channels, i.e., of P XY ZjR = P XjR P Y jR P ZjR . (We sometimes omit all the arguments of the probability distribution functions. In this case the statements hold for all possible choices of arguments. For example, P XjY = P X stands for P XjY (x; y) = P X (x) for all x 2 X and y 2 Y.) From P Y ZjR = X x2X P XY ZjR = X x2X P XjR P Y jR P ZjR = P Y jR P ZjR DRAFTand P R P Y ZjR P XjY ZR = P XY ZR = P R P XjR P Y jR P ZjR we conclude that P XjY ZR = P XjR and, analogously, that P Y jXZR = P Y jR and P ZjXY R = P ZjR . (ii) implies (iii). Let I(X; R) > 0, that is X and R are not statistically independent, which implies that there exists x such that P XjR (x; 0) 6 = P XjR (x; 1), i.e., such that one of the inequalities of (14) holds. Because there must as well exist an element of X satisfying the other inequality of (14) . Similarly we conclude the existence of appropriate y and y 0 from I(Y ; R) > 0. Finally, P RjZ (0; z) 2 f0; 1g for all z 2 Z with P Z (z) > 0 would imply that H(RjZ) = 0. Hence (16) holds for some z 2 Z.
(iii) implies (i). Let x, x 0 , y, y 0 , and z be as in (iii). It su ces to prove that I(X; Y jZ = z) > 0 because P Z (z) > 0. This is equivalent to the statement that X and Y are not statistically independent, given Z = z. We show that P XjY Z (x; y; z) > P XjY Z (x; y 0 ; z) : (17) For both y = y and y = y 0 we have P XjY Z (x; y; z) = P XjR=0 (x) P RjY Z (0; y; z) + P XjR=1 (x) P RjY Z (1; y; z) :
Because P XjR=0 (x) > P XjR=1 (x), in order to prove (17) , we have to show P RjY Z (0; y; z) > P RjY Z (0; y 0 ; z) ; (18) and because of P RjY Z = P Y jR P RZ =(P Y jZ P Z ), inequality (18) 
> P Y jR=0 (y) P RjZ=z (0) + P Y jR=1 (y) P RjZ=z (1)] P Y jR=0 (y 0 ) :
Both inequalities in (19) follow from the fact that 0 < P RjZ=z (0) < 1, and because of (15) . We are now ready to prove Theorem 7.
Proof of Theorem 7: Clearly, (B) implies (C) by Theorem 2, and (C) implies (A) by the de nition of the intrinsic information. We show that (A) implies (B). Given that I(X; Y jZ) > 0, we construct, from R, X, Y , and Z, random variablesR,X,Ỹ , and U with the following properties (see also Figure 5 ):
1.X andỸ are generated from X and Y , respectively, with positive probability.
2.R is binary and symmetric, andX andỸ can be interpreted as being generated by sendingR over two independent binary symmetric channels with identical error probability < 1=2. According to Lemma 12, there exist x; x 0 2 X and y; y 0 2 Y such that (14) and (15) hold. LetX andỸ be obtained from X and Y as follows. First, the ranges of X and Y are restricted to fx; x 0 g and fy; y 0 g, respectively, and secondly, the resulting random variables X 0 and Y 0 (which correspond to a new random experiment) are made symmetric. This is done by sending X 0 over the following channel to obtainX (we assume P X (x) P X (x 0 ) without loss of generality): According to Lemma 12 there exists z 2 Z such that P Z (z) > 0 and 0 < P RjZ (0; z) < 1. Let the random variable U be de ned as follows. If Z 6 = z, let U =R, and if Z = z, let U = . Intuitively, the information U can be thought as being provided by an oracle that tells Eve the correctR if Z 6 = z. Such an oracle can only decrease Eve's average error probability and, according to Lemma Remark. The condition that R is a binary random variable is crucial in Theorem 7. To see this, consider the following example: Let R be uniformly distributed over the set R := fr 00 ; r 01 ; r 10 ; r 11 g, and let X, Y , and Z be binary random variables, generated from R by the following independent channels (let be the Kronecker symbol, i.e., ij = 1 if i = j, and otherwise ij = 0): P XjR (x; r ij ) = xi ; P Y jR (y; r ij ) = yj ; P ZjR (z; r ij ) = z;i j :
Note that for all r 2 R, Z = X Y , that is I(X; Y jZ) = 1. On the other hand I(X; Y ) = 0, and hence S(X; Y jjZ) = 0.
In fact, any distribution P XY Z can be seen as generated by sending a random variable R over three independent channels for some R with jRj jXj jYj jZj. Such a random variable R can be de ned as follows. Let R := fr xyz j (x; y; z) 2 X Y Zg and P XjR (x; r xyz ) = xx , P Y jR (y; r xyz ) = yy , and P ZjR (z; r xyz ) = zz .
V. Towards the General Case: Protocol A Is not Optimal
In this section we assume that X and Y are completely general random variables, and that Eve obtains her information from a random variable that is generated by sending X and Y over erasure channels. The advantage of considering such a scenario is that it is less di cult to analyze than the completely general situation. Additionally, more general situations can be reduced, by the methods of Theorem 6, to such a scenario (with respect to the question whether secret-key agreement is possible).
We approach the general situation by studying two extremal cases. For Scenario 2 below, the statement of Conjecture 1 is shown to be true, whereas for Scenario 3, this problem remains open. Also for Scenario 3, we prove that Protocol A is not optimal. A new protocol is shown to be strictly stronger with respect to the possibility or impossibility of secret-key agreement. If, for X and Y obtained as in Lemma 13 , there exists z 2 Z such that the conditional probabilities P X Y jZ=z (i; j) are positive for all (i; j) 2 f0; 1g 2 , then there exists side information U such that U equals X; Y ] with some probability (that depends on X; Y ]), but where U contains no information about X or Y otherwise, i.e., the pair Z; U] can be interpreted as being generated by sending X; Y ] over an erasure channel with positive erasure probability.
We conclude that very general situations can be reduced to Scenario 2, in which Z is obtained by sending X; Y ] over an erasure channel. In an analogous way, general distributions can be reduced to Scenario 3. However, it appears to be di cult to decide in general which reduction leads to the strongest results. where p a;N = N + (1 ? ) N is the probability that Bob accepts the received block. Given that Bob accepts, Eve (using the optimal strategy) guesses the bit sent by Alice correctly unless she receives N times the erasure symbol . In the latter case her error probability is 1=2, independently of her strategy. Hence Eve's error probability, given that Bob accepts, is In this section we show that a property of the intrinsic information which is similar to the implication from (i) to (ii) in Theorem 14 can be proved also in the case of general random variables X and Y . Namely, we show that I(X; Y #Z) = 0 if Eve knows X and Y precisely with some positive probability, and if the joint distribution of X and Y is \too close" to an \independent distribution". We have to de ne an appropriate measure for the \deviation from independence" of the joint distribution P XY of the two random variables X and Y . Theorem 15 implies that secret-key agreement is impossible under the surprisingly simple and intuitive condition that the probability that Eve reliably knows X and Y equals or exceeds d ind (P XY ).
Theorem 15: Let X and Y be arbitrary random variables with joint distribution P XY , and let Z be generated by sending X; Y ] over an erasure channel with erasure probability 1 ? r. Then r d ind (P XY ) implies I(X; Y #Z) = 0.
Proof: Let r d ind (P XY ) = 1 ? 1=F (P XY ), i.e., F(P XY ) 1=(1 ? r). Then, from the de nition of F(P XY ), we conclude that there exists a distribution Q XY , corresponding to an independent distribution of X and Y , such that
(1 ? r) P XY (x; y) Q XY (x; y) P XY (x; y)
for all x 2 X, y 2 Y, and for some 0 1. We de ne the random variable Z, which can be obtained from Z, as follows. If Z = , then Z = . Because P XY Z (x; y; ) = (1 ? r) P XY (x; y), and because of (24), Z can be de ned to be equal to with some conditional probability when given Z = x; y], and Z = Z otherwise, such that P XY Z (x; y; ) = Q XY (x; y) : (25) This can be done for all pairs (x; y), and (25) In this section we analyze Scenario 3. Let be the probability that X 6 = Y , and let r X and r Y be the probabilities that Eve does not receive the erasure symbol from her (independent) channels. We assume here that r Y r X . For xed and r Y , we prove three di erent upper bounds on r X with the property that secret-key agreement is possible if r X is smaller than at least one of these bounds. Moreover, a new protocol is presented that is applicable for a larger class of distributions P XY Z than Protocol A, hence proving that Protocol A is not optimal for Scenario 3.
The rst upper bound on r X comes from a rather straight-forward argument. According to Theorem 1 the secret key rate is positive if I(X; Y ) > I(X; Z). This condition is equivalent to H(XjY ) < H(XjZ) ; If Lemma 16 does not apply, in some cases one can prove that secret-key agreement is nevertheless possible by using Protocol A. When the block length is N, the probability p 10 that Bob accepts and receives the bit sent by Alice incorrectly, and that Eve receives this bit correctly, is upper bounded by N . On the other hand, the probability p 01 that Bob accepts and receives the correct bit, and that Eve guesses the bit incorrectly, satis es p 01 1 2
The reason for this is that if Eve receives only erasure symbols, her error probability about the bit sent by Alice is, independently of her strategy, equal to 1=2. Finally, the probability p 11 that Bob accepts, and that both Bob and Eve receive the bit incorrectly satis es We remark that each of the expressions in (27) and (29) can be greater than the other.
If r Y is constant and ! 0, the expression of (29) is greater, whereas if r Y = =(1 ? ), the expression of (29) equals 0, and the expression of (27) is greater than 0 for all < 1=2.
Intuitively, the repeat-code protocol (Protocol A) does not appear to be very appropriate in a situation where Eve has perfect access to X or Y with some positive probability, because revealing one bit of a repeat code block means revealing the entire block. It is therefore conceivable that a protocol using blocks which contain a certain fraction (less than half) of incorrect bits is better here, although the e ect that Alice's and Bob's bits become more reliable is weaker in such a protocol. The advantage is that if Eve reliably knows one bit (or a small number of bits) of a block, she does not automatically know the whole block. We will show that in Scenario 3 the following protocol is superior to Protocol A. The analysis of the protocol shows that it is advantageous for Alice and Bob when Bob, and not Alice, is the sender of the bit in Protocol B if r Y r X . Note that Protocol B corresponds to Protocol A for the choice t = 1. Protocol B is, as Protocol A, e cient in terms of computation but wasteful with respect to the achievable rate of generated secret key. An e ciency improvement similar to the parity-check version of Protocol A 12] exists also for Protocol B.
The analysis of this protocol in Scenario 3 is quite technical, and is given in Appendix B, where Theorem 18 is proved. It gives an upper bound on r X when given and r Y . We only mention here the surprising fact that t must typically be chosen only slightly greater than 1=2 (whereas it is obvious that the choice t = 1=2 is completely useless). Theorem 18 shows that in Scenario 3, Protocol B is strictly better than Protocol A, which is therefore not optimal. It is easy to see that the upper bounds of (30) and (31) are greater than the bounds given by (27) and (29) in many cases. We consider two examples.
If r Y is constant and ! 1=2, then the bound given in (27) tends to 0 much faster than (30) (which applies in this situation). The bound of (29) is even negative. On the other hand, if = 3=7, and r Y ! 1, then (27) is smaller than (31) (which applies here).
The bound (29) is negative again.
Note that the bounds (30) and (31) are not tight. In particular, the bounds from an optimal analysis of Protocol B must be greater than the bound from Protocol A because Protocol A is a special case of Protocol B. However, an exact analysis of Protocol B appears to be di cult.
Finally, we give a pessimistic bound on r X for Scenario 3. As in the previous section we derive a condition here for the fact that I(X; Y #Z) = 0. : (32) The proof of Theorem 19 is given in Appendix C. Of course the bound on r X given in (32) is greater than the bounds (27), (29), and (30) (or (31), respectively) for all possible choices of and r Y .
VI. Concluding Remarks
We have investigated the problem of generating a provably secure key by public discussion from correlated information. Steps have been taken towards characterizing under what conditions on this information such secret-key agreement is possible in principle. In particular, we have introduced a new information measure which turned out to provide such a characterization in many situations. However, it is not clear whether this is true in general. For Scenario 3 discussed above, the resulting (su cient but not necessary) Let the protocol parameter t be xed, and let
We rst compute the conditional probability N that Alice receives the bit sent by Bob incorrectly, given that she accepts: Eve's conditional error probability N , given that Alice accepts, is lower bounded by 1=2 times the probability that Eve receives exactly sN of the tN correct bits of Bob's block (more precisely, that she receives the corresponding realizations of Y from the erasure channel, and erasure symbols for the other (t ?s)N realizations of Y that also correspond to correct bits in Bob's block), and exactly the same number of incorrect bits, and that she learns nothing about Alice's block (i.e., about all the realizations of X) because she receives only erasure symbols from that channel. This is a lower bound on N because in this case, Eve's error probability for guessing Bob's bit is equal to 1=2, and is independent of her strategy. This holds for all possible s, and hence the maximum of this probability, taken over all 0 s 1 ? t, gives also a lower bound. 
The idea of the proof of Theorem 30 is to nd the best choice for K (i.e., the best choice of t in Protocol B) with respect to the xed parameters and r Y , and such that (42) holds.
This optimal choice of K leads to an upper bound on r X , such that if r X is smaller than this bound, then Protocol B works for secret-key agreement. This is exactly the upper bound stated in the theorem. 
This bound depends on K, and from (44) we can determine the optimal choice for K (and hence the optimal choice of the protocol parameter t). The only restriction is that the choice must be compatible with (42). It is easy to see that the expression on the right of (44) It is somewhat surprising that if is small and r Y 1 (i.e., in a situation which is not advantageous to Alice and Bob) K must be large, and this means that t is only slightly greater than 1=2 (whereas the choice t = 1=2 is obviously the worst possible choice).
Choosing K = K 0 is compatible with (42) Note that the main objective of the above analysis of Protocol B is to show that it leads to a strict improvement of Protocol A, rather than to characterize the performance of the protocol completely. In particular, the bounds of Theorem 18 are not tight by two reasons. First, it is not necessary to choose t such that r Y =2 is a possible choice for s, as done in the proof of Lemma 21. Secondly, we have compared Alice's error probability with Eve's conditional error probability, given that Alice's bit is correct. Eve's error probability, given that Alice accepts, is greater, because, given that Alice does not receive the correct bit, it is more likely that Eve's bit is also incorrect. However, it appears to be di cult to determine Eve's optimal strategy of guessing the bit, and hence to compute the exact error probability of her guess. Note that with an optimal analysis, Protocol B would clearly turn out to be at least as good as Protocol A in any situation, because Protocol A is a special case of Protocol B and corresponds to the choice t = 1. It is nally conceivable that the above results can be improved when a block protocol is used in which both Alice and Bob (and not only Bob) have a block that is not composed by N times the same bit.
However, such a protocol appears to be much more di cult to analyze. Note that > 1 is not possible. It is easy to see that the random variable Z can be obtained by sending Z over a channel speci ed by some conditional probability distribution P ZjZ .
We The maximal probability P Z ( ; ]) such that the event Z = ; ] can be completely split into Z = i as above is the sum of the probabilities P ZZ ( i ; ; ]) (i = 1; 2; 3) with = 1. (45) and this is equivalent to (32).
Remark. Note that the condition given in the lemma is su cient, but not necessary for I(X; Y # Z) = 0. If r X 6 = r Y , a better bound can be achieved when Z = 0; ] and
